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F~LED IN OFFICE

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COU
STATE OF GEORGIA
GLEN W. ROLLINS, RUTH ELLEN
ROLLINS, NANCY LOmSE ROLLINS,
and O. WAYNE ROLLINS
II, as trustees of The 1993 Gary W. Rollins
Marital Trust,

Plaintiffs.

v.
LOR, INC., GARY W. ROLLINS and
R. RANDALL ROLLINS,
Defendants.

TY

FEB 04 2015

)
)
)
)

) Civil Action No.: 2014CV249480
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Related Cases: 2010CV190046
2011CV203082

COpy

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
On January 14,2015, this Court held a hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
For Judgment on the Pleadings. Upon consideration of the briefs and arguments of counsel, the
Court finds as follows:
Plaintiffs (the "Trustees") are the trustees of The 1993 Gary W. Rollins Marital Trust (the
"Marital Trust"). The sole asset of the Marital Trust is 56,507 non-voting shares of LOR, Inc.
("LOR"). LOR is a Rollins family closely held corporation. Defendants Gary and Randall
Rollins, individually, own both voting and non-voting shares, and the other shares of LOR are
held directly by, or are held in trusts for the benefit of, family members. The Marital Trust's
56,507 non-voting shares represent approximately 18% of LOR's shares.
Ruth Rollins is the ex-wife of Gary, the mother of the Trustees, and the sole lifetime
beneficiary of the interest income of the Marital Trust. As a part of the divorce settlement, Gary
offered to buy Ruth's lifetime income interest in the Marital Trust for $5 million and Ruth agreed
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to seek the approval of the Trustees for this transaction.

The Trustees determined that the offer

was too low and not in Ruth's best interest. The Trustees did not approve of the sale. The
Trustees further allege that over the course of their investigation related to Gary's $5 million
offer, they discovered other wrongdoing by Defendants.

The Trustees allege that Defendants

have mismanaged LOR which has depressed the Marital Trust's income and the value of the
Marital Trust's shares. Trustees also allege that Defendants have made unauthorized cash
withdrawals from the Marital Trust account, and have failed to pay dividends owed. The
Trustees' Complaint includes seven Counts: 1) Inspection of Records, 2) Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, 3) Conversion, 4) Payment of Dividends Owed, 5) Unjust Enrichment, 6) Dissolution, and
7) Attorneys' Fees.
Defendants seek dismissal of all claims except for Count 1 for inspection of records.
First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring Counts 2 and 6 as a direct action
because they are derivative in nature. Second, Defendants argue that Counts 3, 4, and 5, and
portions of Count 2 are barred by a release in Ruth and Gary's divorce settlement agreement.
As a part of the settlement agreement, Ruth and Gary agreed that:
Except for the rights and claims for which this Agreement provides, each party
releases and forever discharges the other from any and all actions, suits, debts,
claims, demands and obligations whatsoever, both in law and equity, which each
of them ever had, now has, or may hereafter have against the other upon or by
reason of any matter, cause, or thing up to the date of the execution of this
Agreement.

Wife hereby releases and forever discharges LOR, Inc. and any of its predecessor
company and its subsidiaries and its affiliates and all of its past and present
employees, officers, directors, shareholders, members, and agents (hereinafter
"LOR"), from any and all actions, suits, debts, claims, demands and obligations
whatsoever, both in law and equity, which Wife ever had, now has, or may
hereafter have against LOR, upon or by reason of any matter, cause or thing up to
the date of the execution of this Agreement.
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Settlement Agreement tj[ 19.
It is well established that:
[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of
provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the
claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the
complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. ... In deciding a motion
to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed
them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing
party's favor.

Scouten v. Amerisave Mortgage Corp., 283 Ga. 72, 73, 656 S.E.2d 820,821

(2008) (quoting

Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997)); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-1112(b)(6).

I.

A Direct Action Is Proper Because the Reasons Underlying the General Rule
on Derivative Actions Do Not Apply (Counts 2 and 6).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to bring a direct action for breach of
fiduciary duty and dissolution. As a general rule, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty or
misappropriation of corporate assets by a director or officer of a corporation belongs to the
corporation, not its shareholders, and should be brought as a derivative action. See O.C.G.A. §§

14-2-153,14-2-123;

see also Barnettv. Fullard, 306 Ga. App. 151, 152 (2010). The reasons

underlying this general rule are that a derivative action: 1) prevents a multiplicity of lawsuits by
shareholders; 2) protects corporate creditors by putting the proceeds of the recovery back with
the corporation; 3) protects the interests of all shareholders by increasing the value of their
shares; and 4) adequately compensates the injured shareholder by increasing the value of his
shares. Thomas v. Dickson, 250 Ga. 772, 786 (1983). The Georgia Supreme Court, while
acknowledging the general rule, directs courts to look to the "realistic objectives" of a given case
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to determine if a direct action is proper. Id. (citing Kaplan's Nadler, Georgia Corporation Law, §

11-16 (1971 )). In other words, a shareholder may bring a direct rather than a derivative action in
the instance of a closely held corporation where the evidence shows that the reasons for the
general rule requiring a derivative suit do not apply. Barnett, 306 Ga. App. at 152; Thomas at
774-75.
The Courts often look to the relationship of the non-party shareholders when weighing
these objectives. In Thomas, for instance, a direct action by a minority shareholder's estate
against a closely held company and the other two shareholders for corporate mismanagement
was proper where the plaintiff alleged that the two defendant shareholders conspired to convert
all profits of the corporation to themselves and deprived the plaintiff of a fair share. Thomas at
773. Likewise, in Parks, the Court of Appeals upheld a direct action by a minority shareholder
of a close corporation in prot because it would be "unlikely" for the other shareholders (the
defendant's wife, children, and mother) to bring suit, and nothing in the record suggested that the
family members had complained about the defendant's management of the company. See Parks
v. Multimedia Technologies, Inc., 239 Ga. App. 282, 287 (1999).
In this case, the other LOR shareholders are Gary and Randall, individually and as
trustees of various trusts, and their children, individually and through various trusts. Although
LOR's management by Gary and Randall has been an issue raised in other related pending
litigation before this Court, the other family member shareholders have not joined in the lawsuits
or the criticism of LOR's management or distributions. To the contrary, the Trustees allege that
the other shareholders affirmatively acquiesced in Gary and Randall's conduct in exchange for
benefits not received by the Trust. These family members also sought to intervene in support of
Gary and Randall in the appeal of a related case challenging the management of LOR. There are
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no alleged creditors and no other compelling reasons why the objectives of a derivative suit
cannot be met with a direct action. Therefore the Court fmds a direct action proper is this case.

II.
Ruth Rollins' Release of Claims Against Defendants In Her Divorce
Settlement Does Not Bar Plaintiff Trustees' Claims.
It is a general principle of trust law that a trust can act only through its trustees and has no

independent legal existence from its trustees. See Pricewaterhousetloopers, LLP v. Bassett, 293
Ga. App. 284,277 (2008). Under O.C.G.A. § 53-12-261 (b)(22)(A), a trustee is authorized to
compromise, adjust, mediate, arbitrate, or otherwise deal with and settle claims involving the
trust. See also Skinner v. DeKalb Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 246 Ga. 561, 563 (1980) ("legal title
is in the trustee and the cause of action is his"). Likewise, the Marital Trust indenture provides
that "[i]n the management, care and disposition of this trust, the Trustees ... shall have the
power ...

[t]o compromise, settle or adjust any claim or demand by or against the trust and to

agree to any rescission or modification of any contract or agreement affecting the trust."). In
contrast, a beneficiary is legally distinct from the trust and does not have these same powers on
behalf of the trust. See Leone Hall Price Found. v. Baker, 276 Ga. 318, 320 (2003) (holding that
trustees were not bound by terms of settlement entered into by beneficiaries that would divest cotrustees of legal title to trust property).
In this case, Gary offered $5 million dollars for the life interest in the income from the
LOR stock held in trust for Ruth, but the agreement was expressly conditioned on the approval
of the Trustees. The Trustees, exercising their authority under clear Georgia law and the terms
of the Marital Trust indenture, did not approve the transaction and no money exchanged hands.
It stands to reason that if Ruth did not have the authority to sell her interest held in trust to Gary

for an agreed-upon amount, she would not have the authority to release or settle any claims that
the Trustees hold on behalf of the Marital Trust. Therefore, only the Trustees, and not Ruth, had

5

the authority to bring and settle claims on behalf of the Marital Trust including Counts 2 through
5 for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, payment of dividends owed, and unjust enrichment.
Ruth's release of her own claims against Gary and LOR by operation of their divorce settlement
agreement had no effect on the Trustees' authority to act on behalf of the Marital Trust, even if
Gary and Ruth intended the release to be broadly construed and to include claims held by the
Marital Trust.
Defendants argue that the Trustees should be barred from bringing an action when the
beneficiary has agreed to settle all claims in order to prevent circuity of action, citing
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 328. Under § 328, "[i]f a claim against a third person is held
in trust, a discharge of the claim given by the beneficiary terminates the liability of the third
person if, but only if, to hold the third person liable would result in circuity of action." The
Comment to § 328 clarifies that this does not create a legal defense. Instead, it notes that an
obligor would have an equitable defense to claims by the trust if it made payment directly to the
beneficiary because the trustee would be required to pay the beneficiary who, having already
been paid, would be obligated to repay the obligor. See § 328, cmt. b. The result would be the
same "where the beneficiary gives the obligor a release of the claim against him." Id. Section
328 has never been applied in Georgia and is not included in Restatement 3d.
Again, it is not clear from the plain language of the release that Ruth intended to release
LOR and Gary from these particular claims held by the Trust, particularly in light ofthe fact that
Ruth and Gary's divorce settlement agreement acknowledges that Ruth does not have the
authority to approve of the sale. The divorce settlement only provides that Ruth would release
Gary and LOR from any claims Ruth ever had, now has, or may have. Ruth did not expressly
release Defendants from claims that the Marital Trust ever had, now has, or may have.
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Therefore, even if the circuity of action equitable defense provided by §328 applied in Georgia,
holding defendants liable would not result in circuity of action, and defendants would not be
entitled to equitable defense under § 328.
Because Plaintiff Trustees have standing to bring a direct action and because the release
by the beneficiary does not bar suit by the Trustees on claims held by the Marital Trust,
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and For Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this

+11-.

r:l..IV~
day of)an'tiilry, 2015.

~bl~~e;v22?~
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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